In spite of the failure of the DeRolph mediation, I posit that the mediation process may play a productive role in the future of school finance cases. Court-ordered mediation may permit the re-structuring of the remedial process in a way that that addresses minority rights which often are lost or minimized in the traditional legislative process. 20 Further, a participatory mediation process holds promise for achieving remedial results in a school finance case that are both educationally viable and politically sustainable. Mediation may open new avenues for the resolution of litigation at the intersection of private process and public policy.
Indeed, there is a potential for voluntary or court-ordered mediation to play a role in the future of the DeRolph case itself. At this writing, implementation of a remedy for the constitutional violations identified by the Court remains elusive. 21 As the parties continue to search for a way to provide an educational system that meets Ohio constitutional mandates, they may once again turn to mediation. This article represents an effort to learn from past failure and to plan for future success in school finance mediation and other public law litigation. 17 See text and accompanying notes infra pp. 395-405. 18 See text and accompanying notes infra pp. 405-17. 19 See text and accompanying notes infra pp. 417-35. 20 For a provocative discussion of a more radically re-structured democratic process, see, Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 267, 314-39 (1998), which describes a redefined democratic selfgovernment, "directly deliberative polyarchy," involving collective problem-solving by citizens and groups suited to local diversity. Id. at 315. Court-ordered mediation of institutional reform may, to a limited extent, participate in the kind of democratic experimentalism envisioned by Professors Dorf and Sabel.
21 Following the failure of the mediation process described in this article, the Court granted the State's motion to reconsider DeRolph III and reinstated DeRolph I and II as the law of the case. See generally DeRolph IV, 2002 Ohio Lexis 3025; see also infra text accompanying notes 237-44. 
II. WHY CONSIDER MEDIATION IN SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION?

A. The Particular Remedial Difficulty of School Finance Litigation
The remedial process in all institutional or structural reform litigation is fraught with theoretical and practical difficulty, 22 but it has been particularly prolonged and troubled in school finance litigation. 23 This is so not only because of the substantive and procedural complexity of school funding reform litigation, but also because of its broad implications for society's governance, fisc, and future.
Education is widely perceived to be the engine of the economy, the safeguard of liberty, and the key to meritocracy. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Brown v. Board of Education: "In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education." 24 Similarly, a representative democracy cannot be reasonably expected to succeed without an educated citizenry. 25 Education is expected not only to produce citizens capable of selfgovernment and to encourage cohesion among diverse peoples, 26 but it is also expected to be "the great equalizer of the conditions of men-the See also Yudof, supra note 2, at 499-500 (analyzing decades of school finance reform in Texas.) 24 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) . 25 As Thomas Jefferson wrote, "If a nation expects to be ignorant and free, in a state of civilization, it expects what never was and never will be." LAWRENCE A. CREMIN (discussing the views of Benjamin Rush and Thomas Jefferson).
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balance wheel of the social machinery. '27 Theoretically, 2 8 and to some extent demonstrably, 29 education is the vehicle of social mobility in modem American society.
State constitutions recognize the importance of education and charge state legislatures with providing for a system of public schools. 30 Although there are deep divisions of opinion among scholars, advocates, and jurists on questions of curriculum, accountability, discipline, etc., there is broad consensus that each child should have an opportunity to an adequate 3 '
education at state expense. 32 In spite of this broad consensus, however, 31 Of course, the content of an "adequate" education remains highly controversial.
Even the term "adequate education" is, itself, a term laden with history. The quest for an "adequate" education, which is the goal of the current "wave" of educational finance reform litigation, was a strategic choice pursued by education advocates in the wake of the failure of lawsuits seeking "equality" or "equity" in education. 32 Even the free market economist, Milton Friedman, who suggested that governments might require a minimum level of education but require parents to pay for it, conceded that preservation of the public good requires public subsidy of education. 
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history demonstrates that democratic processes have failed to provide for the educational needs of every child, particularly those who are poor, who are members of minority groups, or who live in rural areas. 3 3 The probable reasons for the failure of democratic processes to provide universally available, high quality education are complex and manifold, but certainly include localism, 34 private pursuit of educational advantage, 3 5 and children's PRIVATIZATION AND EDUCATIONAL CHOICE 303 (1989) (arguing that parents should pay for their children's education from their own income).
33 The continuing inequality and inadequacy of public schools for poor children, minority children, and children in some rural areas has been documented at trial, in scholarly studies, and in the popular media. Localism reflects territorial economic and social inequalities and reinforces them with political power. Its benefits accrue primarily to a minority of affluent localities, to the detriment of other communities and to the system of local government as a whole. Moreover, localism is primarily centered on the affirmation of private values. Localist ideology and local political action tend not to build up public life, but rather contribute to the pervasive privatism that is the hallmark of contemporary American politics. Localism may be more of an obstacle to achieving social justice and the development of public life than a prescription for their attainment. Id. at 1-2. 35 I have argued elsewhere that during the mid-twentieth century, as educational credentials became the currency of social mobility, and as the middle class sought to insulate their children from downward mobility, schools developed in response to the demands of parents who sought to give their children a competitive advantage. The continuing pursuit of individual educational advantage conflicts and competes with the public goal of providing universally available, high quality education. Molly Townes relative lack of political and economic power. 36 In searching for a reason that our society continues to fail to meet children's needs, Professor Martha Minow suggests, "[p]erhaps because of our troubled heterogeneity, with historic racism and intergroup distrust, we do not view other people's children as ours in many important ways." ' 
37
Whatever the reasons for the failure of democratic processes to provide fully and equally for all children's educational needs, during the past quarter century education advocates have repeatedly turned to the courts seeking to enforce educational rights defined in state constitutions. 38 While educational equity or adequacy is the goal of school finance reform litigation, the chief target of such suits has traditionally been the system of taxing and allocating the resources that support public schools. The "classic" argument under girding school finance reform litigation is that over reliance on local property taxes to fund public schools results in well-funded schools in wealthy districts and poorly-funded schools in poor districts. 39 Plaintiffs have argued that the funding system that creates such disparities is unconstitutional under state constitutional provisions that require state legislatures to provide, for example, an "efficient," "thorough," or "uniform" system of public schools.
40
Seeking "equity" in school funding, plaintiffs have pursued equalization of "input measures, such as total educational and per-pupil spending levels."
Taxing and spending levels, however, are not the sole targets of school finance reform litigation. Recent school finance reform litigation advances a theory that "all children are entitled to an education of at least a certain quality and that more money is necessary to bring the worst school districts O respect of the legislature and the executive not only for its stature and authority, but also for its budget.
The remedial problem is particularly thorny. The court is not capable on its own of devising and imposing a remedy that would be sufficiently democratic to satisfy institutional legitimacy concerns in a representative democracy. On the other hand, if the court returns the task of devising a remedy to the legislature, it returns the problem to a democratic process that has already failed to meet constitutional educational requirements-a process that, given the power of the vested interests opposing reform, is likely to continue to fail.
64
B. The Potential for Mediation
Although the remedial process in public law litigation may take many forms, 65 mediation-or, a process for "developing a consensual remedy through joint fact-finding and collaborative decision-making assisted by a [neutral] third party" 66 -holds special promise for achieving satisfactory results in school finance reform litigation. In important ways, the strengths of mediation speak directly to the difficulties of designing and implementing a remedy in complex, contested public law litigation. Mediation provides a flexible, participatory process that could serve to improve both the quality and legitimacy of the remedy in school finance reform cases.
Mediation, broadly defined, is a structured conciliation process that uses a neutral party to facilitate discussion, negotiation, and, if possible, resolution of a dispute. 6 7 The mediator has no power to impose a resolution, but instead 64 In this regard, school finance reform litigation is analogous to prison reform litigation, about which Professor Sturm wrote, "[c]ourts correctly perceive, either initially or after years of noncompliance, that the underlying causes of the legal violation disable the defendants from complying with a general directive to cease violating the law." Sturm, supra note 8, at 1362-63. 65 Professor Sturm identifies the various models for remedial process to include traditional adjudication, the bargaining model, the legislative or administrative hearing model, the expert remedial formulation model and the "consensual remedial formulation model," which I call "mediation." See id. at 1365-77. 66 Id. at 1373-74. Professor Sturm uses the term "consensual remedial formulation model" to describe the kind of flexible process that I envision when I use the term "mediation" in this article.
67 Mediation has also been defined as a procedure for resolving controversies based on complete agreement, using a third party neutral who has no preference for settlement terms, and has no authority to impose a solution. See JAMES J. ALFINI works with the parties to find a mutually agreeable solution to the problems at hand by providing a forum for exchange of information and for the generation of creative solutions that meet the fundamental interests of all of the parties.
68
Providing an opportunity for collaborative problem-solving and creative thinking about alternative solutions may be particularly valuable in school finance reform, where the content of the remedy is not dictated by the finding of a legal violation. 69 The first-and perhaps most important-potential benefit of using a consensus-building process to design the remedy is the improved quality of the remedy. 70 A mediation process may employ the services of various experts and may bring the expertise of the various participating parties to bear on the remedial problems. 7 1 Participation in a face-to-face negotiation process leads to better information production, enables parties to educate each other, to pool knowledge, to build on the expertise of various participants, and, ultimately, to arrive at high-quality results.
72
The exchange of information and values that takes place in a consensusbuilding process may not only improve the quality of the proposed solution, but may also increase its legitimacy. Mediation gives the parties control over the form of the remedy in a dispute and often results in solutions that are more satisfactory to the parties than any resolution that could have been imposed by court order. Further, mediation may be structured in a way that is accessible to the various constituencies who will ultimately be affected by the resolution of the dispute. In this way, "mediation is a process that takes seriously the philosophy of democratic decision-making. ' 
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structured to consider the views of all of the affected parties. In school finance reform litigation, where a diverse group of organizations, systems and individuals will be affected by the selected remedy, mediation may supply the important benefit of providing a forum for these constituencies to voice their concerns, interests and values. Moreover, when the parties and the various non-party stakeholders in the litigation have played an important role in formulating the remedy, compliance with the mediated outcome is generally as high or higher than compliance with adjudicated outcome. 74 The implementation of a remedy devised through a participatory, consensus-building process may also be easier to achieve "because obstacles to implementation would likely surface and be addressed during negotiations. ' 75 Additionally, the mediation process may work to improve communication among parties, increase understanding, and, perhaps even create a transformative dialogue that permanently alters the dynamics of the relationships among the parties. 76 The best possible outcome for mediation is not only to resolve the conflict at hand, but also to lay the groundwork for improved future interaction. In the realm of school finance, the need for the interested parties to continue to interact is patent: Budgets must be hammered out every year; student populations ebb and flow; standards of achievement change. In this context, the most attractive feature of mediation may be its potential for creating a transformative dialogue and improving future discussion of school finance issues.
III. THE DEROLPH CASE: A BRIEF HISTORY
The history of the DeRolph case provides a lens for viewing the problems of school finance litigation that are described in the abstract above 
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Education voted not to appeal, the Attorney General filed notice of appeal.
82
The trial court was reversed by the Court of Appeals, 83 and the case came to the Ohio Supreme Court on discretionary appeal.
84
In March 1997, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled in a four to three decision that the State had not fulfilled its constitutionally mandated duty to provide for a "thorough and efficient system of education." 85 The majority opinion recited evidence showing that many children in Ohio attended schools in decaying and unsafe buildings and lacked basic materials for learning. 86 Textbooks, paper, chalk, art supplies and even toilet paper were lacking or were rationed in some districts. 8 7 Schools in poor districts lacked library facilities, food services facilities and access to computers and other technologies. 88 High percentages of students in poor districts failed proficiency tests and were not eligible to graduate from high school.
89
The court reviewed the system of funding that created great disparities between wealthy and poor districts, noting several problems that left some districts without sufficient funds. The court cited the State's reliance on a residual budget funding approach, its reliance on local property taxes, the requirement of school district borrowing, and lack of sufficient state funds for construction and maintenance of buildings as particularly problematic. 90 The majority concluded that the State's statutory scheme was incapable of achieving its constitutional purpose. 9 The court stayed the effect of the decision for a year to allow time for new legislation to be enacted and remanded the case to the trial court with directions to retain jurisdiction "until the legislation is enacted and in effect, taking such action as may be necessary to ensure conformity with this opinion." '94 The majority did not give the legislature specific directions on how to correct the deficiencies of the funding scheme. 95 It did, however, "admonish the General Assembly that it must create an entirely new school financing system" 96 and set forth several clear benchmarks for a constitutionally adequate funding system. First, the court made clear that the duty to fund schools falls on the General Assembly, not on the local districts. Funding schools must be a high budgetary priority; according to the court. 9 7 "A thorough and efficient system of common schools," the majority concluded, "includes facilities in good repair and the supplies, materials, and funds necessary to maintain these facilities in a safe manner, in compliance with all local, state, and federal mandates." 98 The court identified four additional aspects of the schoolfunding scheme that needed to be eliminated, specifically:
(1) the operation of the School Foundation Program, (2) the emphasis of Ohio's school funding system on local property tax, (3) the requirement of school district borrowing through the spending reserve and emergency school assistance loan programs, and (4) the lack of sufficient funding in the General Assembly's biennium budget for the construction and maintenance of public school buildings.
99
A three-member minority of the court-comprised of Justices Moyer, 3317 
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Cook, and Lundberg Stratton-dissented, finding no constitutional violation and arguing that the majority had exceeded its authority.' 00 "The issues of the level and method of funding, and thereby the quality of the system," wrote Chief Justice Moyer, "are committed by the Constitution to the collective will of the people through the legislative branch."'' Chief Justice Moyer raised the specter of the long-lived school finance controversies in New Jersey, Texas, California, and Connecticut.1 02 School finance litigation in these states, he argued, demonstrates the "grim reality of a state supreme court involving itself in setting minimum educational standards, which has resulted in years of protracted litigation, ultimately placing the courts in the position of determining state taxation methods, budgetary policies, and educational policy."' 0 3 Although the dissenters did not endorse the status quo in schools, they argued that the majority's decision violated the separation of Id. at 786.
powers doctrine and decided a nonjusticiable question. 0 4 Following the 1997 Ohio Supreme Court decision, Governor George Voinovich proposed a one-cent sales tax to raise money for schools. 1 0 5 This measure died in the House; a similar measure was eventually submitted to the voters and was defeated in May 1998.106 Meanwhile, the General Assembly enacted several school reform provisions, including statutes creating the Ohio School Facilities Commission, establishing school district performance standards, and making appropriations for emergency repairs. 10 7 In November 1998, out-going Governor Voinovich hired Achieve, Inc.-a group founded in 1996 by governors and business leaders and staffed by conservative scholars-to provide the General Assembly, incoming Governor Robert Taft, the new State Superintendent of Education, and state legislators with "a candid assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of Ohio's reform strategy."' 1 0 8 The work of that group was on-going when the time to report back to the trial judge, Judge Lewis, arrived.
In the summer of 1998, the plaintiffs returned to the trial court maintaining that the General Assembly had failed to comply with the mandate of the Supreme Court. 10 On May 11, 2000, in a second divided opinion-split along the same lines as the DeRolph I decision-the Supreme Court reviewed the efforts of the General Assembly and declared them to be insufficient to correct the constitutional deficiencies of the school funding system. 115 The steps taken by the General Assembly fell short of correcting the constitutional problems, the majority opined, because it had not addressed the system's over-reliance on local property taxes. 1 1 6 Further, the General Assembly had not adjusted the basic aid formula to reflect the amount actually needed to educate each child; had not appropriated sufficient funds to repair and replace decrepit school buildings; had enacted new unfunded mandates placing new requirements on school districts; and had not corrected problems relating to the calculation of revenue available from local property taxes.
117
The majority acknowledged the difficulty and complexity of revising the funding scheme and carefully avoided telling the legislature what specific new laws must be enacted. 1 18 It did, however, attempt to give substance to the "thorough and efficient" standard, saying, A thorough system means that each and every school district has enough funds to operate. An efficient system is one in which each and every 114 DeRolph II, 728 N.E.2d at 1001. 115 Id. at 1020. ("We acknowledge the effort that has been made, and that a good faith attempt to comply with the constitutional requirements has been mounted, but even more is required.").
116 Id. at 1021. (Failure to address the problem of reliance on local property taxes "will make it exceedingly difficult for any system of school funding to comply with the Thorough and Efficient Clause, since the inherent inequities will remain.").
117 Id. 118 Id. at 1019-20.
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school district in the state has an ample number of teachers, sound buildings that are in compliance with state fire and building codes, and equipment sufficient for all students to be afforded an educational opportunity.
119
The court retained jurisdiction over the case, continuing it until June 2001 when the parties would return before the Supreme Court and a new briefing schedule would be put in place. 120 The court declined to appoint a special master to oversee the State's compliance with the court's order.
21
Instead of relying on any court-allied process, the majority returned the dispute to the political fray, saying,
We hope that partisan views will be put aside and that everyone will work cooperatively for Ohio's children, as they are our future. The General Assembly, in particular, must look beyond the political considerations involved, and must provide Ohio's school children with a thorough and efficient system of common schools, as the Ohio Constitution requires. 1 22
The court quoted the hopeful rhetoric of the Achieve, Inc. report: "This may be a propitious moment to forge a new social compact between Ohio's government policymakers and its education community."' 12 3 As later events would reveal, the moment was not as propitious as it then appeared to be.
Following the May 2000 ruling, action on the Supreme Court's mandate appeared to stall in the General Assembly. The joint legislative committee that was formed to recommend funding changes met only a few times.
124
Meanwhile the Ohio Chamber of Commerce backed a multi-million dollar campaign to defeat Justice Alice Robie Resnick, the author of the DeRolph 11 majority decision, in her campaign for reelection.' 25 State budget cuts were predicted. Following the landslide reelection of Justice Resnick, however, the Ohio General Assembly once again embarked on a legislative tour through the school funding provisions, making a series of revisions and new appropriations. With only one month left before the scheduled argument When the case reappeared on the Supreme Court docket in the summer of 2001, however, plaintiffs were adamant that the State had failed to follow the mandate of DeRolph I and DeRolph H. The State had not corrected the over-reliance on local property taxes, had put in place what plaintiffs alleged to be a faulty formula for calculating state aid, and had failed to address various factors that put revenue pressure on local school districts. 1 29 Defendants maintained that its legislative effort to improve schools was producing greatly increased revenue for schools and improving quality and standards of performance. State per pupil allocations had been increased; a 12-year, $23 billion plan to repair and replace old schools was in place; special allocations called "parity aid" would now give additional funds to poorer districts; and new proficiency tests had been devised. 1 30 The Ohio Supreme Court found itself in a difficult position as it set out to make its third decision on the constitutionality of the school funding scheme. 131 Four years after its bold decision declaring the funding system to be unconstitutional, state budget allocations for schools had increased, but the "complete overhaul" that was directed in the 1997 decision had not taken place. Political and media pressure on the court had become intense. The 
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court was widely blamed for budget cuts in popular state programs. 1 32 The General Assembly seemed incapable of making the structural changes in the system envisioned in DeRolph I and II, and the task of overseeing incremental revisions-tinkering toward a constitutional funding systemappeared endless. Further, if the court held the current scheme to be unconstitutional, it seemed likely that $1.4 billion in additional budget allocations for education-already calculated in local school budgets-would "be reallocated to the other state institutions and programs so severely cut to accommodate the school funding plan."' 133 Three of the justices had consistently opposed the Supreme Court's involvement in school funding issues. Now, for two members of the original majority-Justice Douglas and Justice Pfeifer-finding some way to end the Supreme Court's involvement in school funding seemed to be central.1
34
The DeRolph III 135 decision issued on September 6, 2001, was a selfproclaimed compromise. 1 36 Chief Justice Moyer, who had dissented from the majority opinions in both DeRolph I and DeRolph II, wrote for a threemember plurality that included justices Douglas and Pfeifer, members of the previous majorities. Justice Lundberg Stratton, formerly a member of the dissenting minority, filed a short opinion, concurring in the judgment only. Thus, the DeRolph III majority consisted of two members of the previous majority and two members of the previous minority. Chief Justice Moyer began by describing the differences of opinion existing among the justices on the court. Invoking the wisdom of Thomas Jefferson, however, he opined that the time had come to sacrifice individually held opinions for the sake of harmony. 137 "None of us," he admitted, "is completely comfortable with the decision we announce in this opinion."' 138 He wrote, A climate of legal, financial, and political uncertainty concerning Ohio's school-funding system has prevailed at least since this court accepted 132 Programs cut to accommodate the school funding plan included, inter alia, higher education, mental health, protection of battered women, and prison security. Id. at 1210 (Douglas, J., concurring). Chief Justice Moyer went on to undertake a detailed review of the revised state law provisions for funding public schooling, noting changes relating to the calculation of the base per student allocation, 140 the addition of "parity aid" for poorer districts, 14 1 new programs to improve school facilities, 14 2 new academic standards, 143 and measures reducing the disparity in funding produced by funding schools through local property taxes. 144 These measures, taken together, said Moyer, demonstrated a commitment by the legislature and the governor to improve public education in Ohio. 1 45 The school-funding scheme, as it was presented to the court, required only two changes to meet constitutional scrutiny. With a change in the method of calculating the basic cost of an adequate education and full funding for the parity aid program, the state's school-funding program could be constitutionally implemented, Moyer concluded. 146 These changes would require additional funding, but would not require a new legislative scheme. 1
47
Chief Justice Moyer's opinion pulled together a fragile agreement among four justices, grounded more in policy and practical reasoning than in legal principle. Justice Lundberg Stratton, who provided the fourth vote for the majority, stated in her short concurrence that her opinion on the merits had not changed, but that she joined the majority as "a pragmatic compromise to resolve an impasse that I believe has been divisive for too long and for which the alternatives proposed by the dissents are truly unacceptable."' ' 148 Id. at 1216 (Stratton, J., concurring).
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The opinions of the justices in the plurality reflect a strong desire to reach a resolution in a particularly difficult and divisive case. The justices considered a wide variety of remedial options, 149 but did not discuss the possibility of appointing a mediator to assist the parties in resolving the dispute for themselves. Justice Douglas briefly entertained the option of appointing a special master or blue ribbon commission to oversee the remedial process, but rejected the idea without analysis, saying, only "[t]here were never four votes for this approach."'
150
As conciliatory and tentative as is the tone of the plurality opinions, so are the dissents vehement. In strongly worded dissents, Justices Sweeney and Resnick, who were members of the majority in DeRolph I and II, detailed the continuing deficiencies of the state's funding scheme and criticized the majority for abandoning the principles enunciated in the previous two DeRolph decision.151 "The majority," wrote Justice Resnick, "places entirely too much importance on political expedience and not nearly enough on justice."' 152 Justice Cook, taking a position on the ideological opposite end from justices Resnick and Sweeney, argued in her dissent that the decision of the majority illustrated the reasons why the court never should have become involved in school funding issues in the first place. 153 The issues are necessarily questions of policy and should be left in the hands of the legislature. "The judicial oath of office," she declared, "requires me to support the Ohio Constitution and to perform the duties of a judge-not of a legislator." 54 Almost before the Supreme Court photocopy machines were cool, the authority of the fragile four-member majority opinion came into question. Plaintiffs had based their arguments on incorrect numbers, howled state officials. 155 If the state were to implement the changes in the method of calculating the per student base cost as required by DeRolph III, the increased cost to the state would far exceed the amount contemplated by the court. Instead of $400 million, the changes required in DeRolph III would cost an additional $1.2 billion. 1 56 The court had been the subject of controversy before the DeRolph III Indeed, the majority had based its assumptions on numbers that were incorrect. 158 The changes required by DeRolph III would be much more expensive than the majority had anticipated and might throw the entire state budget process into disarray. The court granted the state's motion to reconsider and, in a move that was widely perceived to be a "punt," 159 referred the parties to mediation. 1 60
IV. THE FAILURE OF THE DEROLPH MEDIATION
A few short months after the DeRolph case was referred to mediation, the mediator reported back to the court that the parties were unable to reach a resolution. 16 1 The newspapers proclaimed that the mediation was a "doomed" effort from its inception and its failure was a "foregone conclusion."' 162 The position of Justice Resnick, who had opposed referring the case to mediation, appeared to be vindicated. "Today the parties on each side are firmly entrenched in their positions," Justice Resnick had written.1 63 And "the oral arguments before us in this matter made it clear that mediation is an impractical solution."' 164 Indeed, the uncompromising tone of the arguments presented by the parties combined with the longevity and complexity of the dispute might seem to dim the realistic prospects of achieving a mediated resolution, making the mediation requirement nothing more than an expensive additional layer of process. 1 65 But neither the strident tone of appellate oral arguments nor the number of years of inability to resolve their differences provides an accurate predictor of success in mediation. 166 While there may be many reasons why the attempt to resolve the DeRolph litigation through mediation failed, 167 I will focus on two matters that are highly determinative of success in any mediation, but that merit special attention in institutional reform litigation: (1) participant motivation, and (2) the identification and involvement of appropriate stakeholders. I will suggest that the best possibility for reaching a mediated resolution in a school 165 The costs of mediation in the DeRolph case can be measured concretely in terms . The time cost of the attempted mediation amounts to roughly six months delay in a decision by the Ohio Supreme Court on the merits of the motion to reconsider. Of course, the time "cost" may be interpreted as a true detriment to the plaintiffs, who await implementation of a remedy in the case, but as a benefit to the defendants, who seek to avoid a judicially imposed remedy. In cases where one party uses mediation to delay the settlement of the case, mediation can potentially add one more layer to a process that will eventually end up back in court. LAVINIA HALL, NEGOTIATION: STRATEGIES FOR MUTUAL GAIN 57 (1993). These "costs" may seem fairly trivial in the scope of a case with an eleven-year history in litigation. Nevertheless, the law should not require a useless act. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74 (1980) ("The law does not require the doing of a futile act."). If requiring mediation serves only to delay resolution, then court-ordered mediation cannot be justified. The success of any mediation may be affected by highly particular factors such as the personalities and negotiating skills of the participants or the skill of the mediator. Because these factors do not lend themselves to generalization, they will not be discussed here at any length. I should mention, however, that the mediator who was appointed in this case, Howard S. Bellman, is a highly respected and eminently well-qualified mediator who has extensive experience in mediating environmental policy issues, labor contracts, and school disputes. It seems unlikely that the Court could have found any person who would have been better prepared than Mr. Bellman for the task of facilitating settlement in this case. funding case-and perhaps in other institutional reform litigation -might be achieved in a process that resembles a public policy facilitation, but that remains closely tied to the court, with the accompanying prospect of court intervention for remediation and resolution. Such a process would require a clear and unequivocal statement by the court declaring the rights of the parties and remedial principles, incentives to permit participation by a broad range of non-litigant stakeholders, a generous time frame, and a team of highly skilled mediators.
A. Motivation to Settle
Mediation is a facilitated negotiation that depends for its success, to a large extent, on the motivation of the parties. None of the potential benefits of mediation may be realized unless the participants are motivated to resolve the dispute. 168 Even when mediation is court-ordered, its goal is voluntary settlement. The court may compel attendance, but not resolution. 169 Thus, mediation is driven by the professional, practical, and personal goals and motivations of the participants. 170 Parties in a case that has been litigated 168 For a discussion of the potential benefits of mediation, see supra Part II.B.
169 The authority of the Supreme Court of Ohio to order the parties to attend mediation is found in OHIO SUP. CT. R. 14(6), which provides as follows:
Settlement Conferences (A) Referral of cases for settlement conferences
The Supreme Court may, sua sponte or on motion by a party, refer to a master commissioner for a settlement conference any case that originated in the court of appeals, any appeal from an administrative agency, any original action, or any nonfelony case that the Supreme Court deems appropriate. The master commissioner may conduct the settlement conference in person or by telephone. At the settlement conference, the parties shall explore settling the case, simplifying the issues, and expediting the procedure, and may consider any other matter that might aid in resolving the case.
(B) Attendance
If a case is referred for a settlement conference, each party to the case, or the representative of each party who has full settlement authority, and the attorney for each party shall attend the conference, unless excused, in writing, by the master commissioner to whom the case has been referred. If a party or an attorney fails to attend the conference without being excused, the Supreme Court may assess the party or the attorney reasonable expenses caused by the failure, including reasonable attorney fees or all or a part of the expenses of the other party. The Supreme Court may also dismiss the action, strike documents filed by the offending party, or impose any other appropriate penalty. 170 Irvine, supra note 166, at 346.
through judgment and appeal, or, as in this case, through several judgments and several appeals, may have considerable resistance to settlement. 171 Without significant motivational incentives for settlement, parties are unlikely to set aside strongly held positions. Experience in appellate mediation has demonstrated, however, that despite the hardening of positions that occurs in prolonged litigation, parties frequently have strong motivation to settle a case pending on appeal. 172 In even the most long-lived and seemingly intractable disputes, the parties may be moved to settle by a variety of factors including, (1) a professional assessment of the risks of an unfavorable decision by the court; (2) the cost of continued litigation; (3) the need for immediate relief; (4) the possibility of achieving a flexible or creative result that might not be available by court-order; and (5) the desire to reach a fair resolution of the problem. 173 The common thread in the first three factors just mentioned is some identifiable risk of continuing to litigate or an identifiable benefit of immediate settlement. Without some risk inherent in the legal process (or in the delay involved in using the process) and aversion to that risk, 174 it may be difficult to generate motivation to settle.
The Court's Role in Defining the Risk of Non-Settlement
Generally, incentives to settle operate in institutional reform litigation as they would in any litigation. 175 The court must, however, deliver the case to mediation with the incentives to settle intact. This is particularly true in a RABBIT (1978) . In "The Tar Baby" Brer Fox captures Brer Rabbit and prepares to cook him up in a stew. Brer Rabbit feigns relief that he will be eaten-rather than subjected to a worse punishment. He begs Brer Fox not to throw him into the briar patch. Brer Fox, wanting to cause Brer Rabbit the maximum pain, throws Brer Rabbit into the briar patch. Brer Rabbit dances away, saying "I was bred and born in the briar patch!" 175 See generally Schlanger, supra note 10 (discussing incentives for settlement in prison reform litigation). mandatory, court-ordered mediation. When it is necessary to order parties to attempt to resolve the dispute through mediation, it can be assumed thatwithout the order to mediate-the barriers to effective negotiation and settlement are higher than the parties' pre-existing motivation to settle. In mandatory mediation, it is the power of the court and the identified legal framework for decision that creates an impetus for settlement and, to some extent, sustains the parties' motivation to negotiate. 1 7 6 The court plays a major role not only in creating the forum and structuring the process, but also in defining the risk of non-settlement.' 77 The risk of non-settlement is defined in large part by the prospect of continued court action. The credible threat that the court will, in fact, take action if a settlement is not reached plays an essential role in motivating the parties to move toward resolution. In an ordinary private civil action, this is generally taken for granted. The parties know as they begin a court-ordered mediation that if no settlement is reached, the court will decide the case for them. Judgment will be entered and executed. In a case where the court has found that one party has violated the rights or property of the other, the litigants may properly expect that the party whose rights or property were violated will be vindicated and the wrongdoer will have to pay. 178 The parties may assume that the court will impose a remedy that is not of the wrongdoer's own choosing. In a school funding case, however, these assumptions do not necessarily apply.
After finding constitutional violations in cases challenging school funding, state courts have frequently deferred to the legislature or executive 176 Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REv. 668, 682 (1986) (observing that the option to resort to court adjudication provides essential motivation for cooperation in the process: "It is only because handicapped children have a statutory right to education that parent-school mediation is successful. It is only because tenants have procedural rights that landlords will bargain at all.").
177 Another way that negotiation theorists describe the dynamics surrounding the "risk of non-settlement" uses the term "BATNA" or "Best Alternative to a Negotiated to fashion a remedy. 179 Rather than impose a remedy of its own making, a state court dealing with a school funding case is likely to put the task of designing a remedy back in the hands of the defendant, the rights-violating party. 180 Even where the legislature has repeatedly failed to implement a remedy that satisfactorily addresses the identified constitutional violations, courts have left the task of formulating a remedy in the hands of the legislature. 18 1 If the participants representing the legislature can anticipate that the legislature will be allowed to choose its own remedy following an unsuccessful mediation, they may perceive no risk inherent in failing. 182 It hardly needs to be pointed out that, "[n]o group should choose to be part of a negotiation if what it can obtain 'away from the bargaining table' is better than what it is likely to get by negotiating." 183 The court's deference to the legislature on the issue of remedy has the effect of taking the wind out of the motivational sails of the mediation process. 
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Courts defer the remedial process to the legislature in school finance cases for a number of theoretical and practical reasons related to the judiciary's own power, legitimacy, and competency. 1 85 It is beyond the scope of this article to undertake a full discussion of the separation of powers and political question doctrines that underlie judicial deference to the legislature in school finance cases. 186 Nevertheless, the prospects for successful mediation are dimmed unless the court expresses the determination to take hold of the remedial reigns if the mediation process fails. In other words, if the court wants the mediation process to be successful, it should send the parties to mediation with clear forewarning that it will not continue to defer to the legislature for resolution if the process fails.
Moreover, the court should refer the case to a mediation process early in the remedial phase of the litigation, before resentment has built up in the legislature and before the parties might infer from the court's actions an unwillingness or inability to act decisively if legislative action does not satisfy constitutional requirements. In the Ohio school finance litigation, the order referring the parties to mediation came when the litigation was more than a decade old, and after the Supreme Court had given the legislature an opportunity to cure constitutional deficiencies-not once, but twice. 187 By 185 See supra text accompanying notes 38-63. 186 The goal of this paper is to explore whether and how mediation might be useful in resolving school funding cases. It does not attempt to analyze the separation of powers and political question doctrine, but instead assumes that the judiciary has the power to act in this arena. For argument supporting the exercise of judicial power in school finance cases, see Blanchard, supra note 59. Mr. Blanchard argues that state courts have strained to abdicate their authority over education finance under the aegis of the separation of powers and political question doctrines, which are federal doctrines that are not freely transferable to state constitutional analysis. Id. at 246-49. He further argues that local control in school matters is a policy choice rather than a matter of state constitutional requirement and that the dangers of the tyranny of the majority are far more critical at the state level. Therefore, he asserts that state courts should exercise vigorous protection of individual rights under revitalized state constitutions. the time mediation was ordered, legislative resentment of the court's actions was palpable. Justice Douglas expressed his concern in DeRolph III:
[T]oday we live in different times. We hear from certain members of the General Assembly that we can say whatever we want but those pronouncements will be ignored. We hear some members of the General Assembly saying that impeachment of one or more justices might be in order and, in fact, we have one self-proclaimed constitutional law expert, a professor, advocating our impeachment or removal from office and stating that the General Assembly has a duty to ignore court orders .... 188
An ideal mediation order in a school finance case would come early in the remedial phase of the litigation-perhaps after the court has given the legislature one opportunity to enact constitutional school funding legislation without further court action 189 -and would outline the procedures for resolution that the court will follow if the mediation effort is unsuccessful. The practice of setting forth' the steps that will follow an unsuccessful mediation is already common in cases referred to mediation or to special masters in the federal court. [T]he court engaged in brazen lawmaking and, in the process, usurped policymaking authority from the legislative and executive branches .... By acting to assert itself either by removing overreaching justices, ignoring the court's attempt to make policy, or introducing a constitutional amendment reaffirming the separation of powers, the legislature would be fulfilling its duty to resist judicial usurpation of legislative authority. Owsiany, supra note 186, at 561.
189 The possibility that the legislature might take steps to cure constitutional deficiencies without further court action should not be discounted or ignored. In Vermont, the state legislature enacted a far-reaching school finance reform package just four months after the Vermont Supreme Court declared that the state's education finance system violated the state constitution. See motivation to participate by giving a clear picture of the remedial alternative that would be set in motion if the parties fail to reach a resolution of their own devising. For example, the court could decide in advance of the mediation that, in case of failure of the mediation, it would appoint an independent, five-member blue-ribbon commission. 19 1 Specific details could be included. For example, the court could announce that the commission would be composed of members with expertise in law, finance, taxation, education and labor relations and would develop a specific legislative proposal to meet the state's constitutional requirements relating to school funding; and that the court would submit the commission's proposal to the legislature, following approval by the court, with an accompanying order to enact it.1 92 In its order setting up the mediation, the court could also demonstrate its commitment to an effective remedy by outlining sanctions that would be imposed if the legislature failed to enact the legislation formulated by the blue-ribbon commission. These sanctions might include escalating fines on the legislative body, or, perhaps, an order enjoining the collection of taxes pending favorable legislative action.
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Supreme Court Practice Rule that provides the authority for requiring settlement conferences and the appointment of a special master or mediator is similarly broad and contains no restrictions that would prevent the court from providing a procedural roadmap. See OHIO SuP. CT. PRAC. R. XIV(6).
191 Justice Douglas considered this option in DeRolph III, but stated that there were only three justices who supported the idea. DeRolph III, 754 N.E.2d at 1211.
192 Id. 193 According to Professor Sturm, the authority of the court to exercise "coercive power to eliminate ongoing public law violations rests on a solid jurisprudential foundation." Sturm, supra note 8, at 1378. "The legitimacy of these techniques derives from the widely accepted principle that rights should find vindication in an effective remedy." Id. at 1379. The power of the court to coerce compliance with its orders through the use of its contempt power, including the use of fines, injunctions, or confinement, is inherent in the court and not subject to legislative control. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Cincinnati Dist. Council, 299 N.E.2d 686 (Ohio 1973). Further, the inherent power of the courts, both state and federal, to effectuate a remedy that protects the constitutional rights of the parties generally includes the power to require a taxing authority to levy taxes. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 57 (1990) ("[A] local government with taxing authority may be ordered to levy taxes in excess of the limit set by state statute where there is reason based in the Constitution for not observing the statutory limitation.").
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The Court's Role in Creating A Substantive Framework For Resolution
If the mediation order in -the Ohio school finance litigation had come earlier in the litigation 194 and had set forth a fall-back remedial procedure, it would have delivered the matter to the mediator with better prospects for generating motivation to settle than did the mediation order that was entered in 2001.195 Better timing and a fall-back procedure alone, however, are not the only factors affecting party motivation that are within the court's sphere of influence and responsibility. A court order referring a case to mediation ought to create a substantive remedial framework that is neither too specific nor too general-a substantive framework that allows and encourages the participants to find their own resolutions to the difficult issues raised in school finance cases. The framework for decision should provide the normative parameters for resolution and at the same time leave room for creative problem solving. Professor Sturm points out, "[a]lthough these normative parameters do not provide the basis for selecting among the remedial alternatives designed to realize the liability norm, they do define the remediation norm as both the driving force and constraint of the deliberative process."1
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In referring a case to mandatory mediation, the court's task is to walk a tight-rope. It ought to define the risk of non-settlement and remedial norms, but leave options open to permit the parties flexibility in choosing a resolution that meets their needs and interests. The court must give sufficient guidance, but leave a realm of ambiguity to motivate the parties to formulate a remedy of their own.
The mediation process is not the appropriate forum for the formulation of the substantive liability norms or the basic remedial norms. Professor Lawrence Susskind, a well-known scholar of alternative dispute resolution processes, makes a distinction "between disputes about rights (whether or not something ought to be done) and disputes about how to do something, given that there is agreement that it ought to be done. Consensus building processes," he says, "can be used to help with the second type of dispute but "' 198 Particularly in cases involving the ideals of equal justice, the court must play an important role that a consensus building process cannot. As Professor Richard Abel points out, " [l] aw is the sole arena within which unequals can hope to achieve justice. Only equals can risk a confrontation within the informal processes of the economy and the polity. "' 199 Left to their own devices, legislatures and executive agencies, even if they acknowledge the existence of inequities or inadequacies, are not likely to provide meaningful relief, since they tend to be answerable politically to the established power interests that benefit from the status quo. Thus, once a constitutional value has been identified, it is the courts that must initiate and sustain an effective colloquy. In doing so, the courts should provide the legislative and executive branches with clear guidelines on expected directions and a workable framework for organizing and monitoring the results .... 200 Within the context of a consensus building process, a well-articulated statement of rights and remedial principles acts to counterbalance the power of the parties representing the status quo, placing the parties on more closely equal footing. It establishes a framework for discussion without inappropriately attempting to decide the details of implementation. 20 1 It empowers the parties to devise their own resolution, and, with the continued participation of the court in the process, serves to motivate them to move toward resolution. 201 In addition to providing a favorable context for creative problem solving, an order that allows the participants to devise the remedial details would capitalize on the unique competencies of the participants and accommodate, to some degree, for separation of powers concerns.
In the DeRolph case, the mediation was required to go forward in the absence of a clear statement of rights and remedial principles. The court had issued opinions in March 1997 and in May of 2000, either of which would have served as a sufficient guiding document for a mediation process. 20 2 In its 1997 opinion, the court held the state's statutory school finance scheme to be unconstitutional, identified aspects of the school funding scheme that required change, and established benchmarks for any new funding scheme that might be devised. 20 3 Again, in May 2000 the court articulated the constitutional values involved and attempted to give substance to the concept of a "thorough and efficient" public education." 20 4 By the time the court referred the case to mediation, however, the clarity of the principles involved had been significantly undermined-if not totally uprooted-by the DeRolph III compromise decision. The decision appeared to yield to political resistance to its earlier orders, backing down from its earlier finding that a funding system based primarily on local property taxes was constitutionally defective. 20 5 Worse, however, than the apparent concessions on earlier declared principles, the court failed to enunciate any new principles to explain its resolution of the issues. Moreover, although the court's compromise did not state new principles or reasons sufficient to justify its conclusions, it did choose to "split the baby" in a very specific way. The DeRolph III decision provided a very specific remedy-the inclusion of different factors in certain funding equations, and full funding of other provisions. 20 6 The decision was intended to end debate, not to serve as a framework for continued discussion. When it became apparent that the decision to split the baby did not end debate because the numbers it was based on were incorrect, the case was referred to a mediator in a context where one might appropriately assume that the only issue to be decided was: "How can we adjust the existing funding formulas in a way that will result in a financial resolution closest to the one that the court intended in the DeRolph III decision?" This very narrow question does not lend itself well to creative thinking about options and the generation of win-win solutions.
Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion to the order referring the case to mediation, expressed his view that the mediator could consider not only the matters raised in the State's motion to reconsider, but also any other issues in the case, including a complete systematic overhaul of the state's school funding system. 20 8 It, seems unlikely, however, that once a majority of the court had endorsed the basic provisions of a school-funding scheme (as the court did in DeRolph III) that the state would agree to consider any remedy that would fundamentally alter those basic provisions. Thus, the DeRolph III decision substantially impaired the ability of the parties to fashion their own remedy, depriving the mediation process of its greatest potential.
B. Identifying and Including Stakeholders
In convening any mediation, the first obligation of a successful mediator is to make sure that all of the stakeholders in the conflict have been identified and are either present at the table or are represented in the process. Lengthy discussions and difficult compromises will count for nothing if at the end of the day parties who were not involved in the process appear and decide to oppose implementation of the resolution. The experience of the effort to resolve an Alabama school funding case using a facilitated settlement process is instructive on this point. There the Circuit Court of Montgomery County entered an order finding that the system of public education in Alabama was unconstitutional and directed the legislature to develop a comprehensive remedy plan with the assistance of a courtappointed facilitator. 2 10 Over the period of the next several months plaintiffs not result from mediation, however, she argues that mediation must provide the participants with the opportunity to explore options, to tell their stories, and to gain the experience of procedural justice. Id. at 855. The brainstorming and mutual re-education that occurs in a process with possibilities for a variety of remedial options is valuable, even if a "win-win" solution is not the outcome. 210 Pinto v. Alabama Coalition for Equity, 662 So.2d 894, 897 (Ala. 1995). Initially, the legislature resisted and sought an advisory opinion from the Alabama Supreme Court that would declare that the legislature was not under any duty to comply with the Circuit and defendants worked together with the facilitator and devised a comprehensive remedial plan. 211 All of the participants in the case were satisfied with the plan, which would be implemented subject to the court's approval following a "fairness hearing." 2 12 Two days before the scheduled fairness hearing a group claiming to represent "taxpayers and citizens of Alabama" moved to intervene and to oppose both the finding of liability and the proposed remedial plan. 2 13 Although the Circuit Court denied the petitions to intervene, the interveners were ultimately successful in derailing the settlement process.
14
The participation of all of the stakeholders, particularly those who will cause trouble-that is, those who may oppose or thwart the implementation of any eventual resolution of the dispute-is essential to the process. Gaining the assent of the most vocal activists and the most difficult opponents of reform is key to the successful implementation of the remedy. Although the involvement of stakeholders is central to the mediation, the process by which the interested stakeholders are identified and integrated, either individually or through representatives, is not uniform. It has been described as an "art. '2 16 School finance reform presents a stakeholder palette that would challenge even the most skillful mediation artist. When Ohio Governor Bob Taft devised a list of the groups that he believed "are involved in the school funding debate in one way or another," the list included important governmental actors, state agencies, and dozens of professional associations On the other hand, litigation pending in court is not typically held open for public participation. 22 1 Including the interested constituencies in mediating a school finance lawsuit would require a process that would reach beyond the litigants named in the action. Involving various non-litigant members of the public in the remedial process of pending litigation concerning constitutional rights with broad impact is not unprecedented.
222
Including non-litigants in court-ordered mediation may, in fact, be widely practiced with the consent of the litigating parties. Using an inclusive, consensus-building process at the intersection of public-policy facilitation and private litigation may be a common mode of dealing with litigation that has broad public impact, but the practice is not generally documented.
To be clear, the process I envision would not be "open to the public" in the common sense of that expression. Rather, interested groups would be identified by the mediator or team of mediators, who would choose representatives and would form sub-groups or coalitions based on their areas of interest or expertise. The mediator, in consultation with the litigating parties, would control the size and composition of the participant group.
223
While the prospect of identifying representatives from an almost unlimited group of interested stakeholders may appear daunting, in fact, the time commitment and real work obligation of a mediation process acts to limit the 220 task of the mediator is to empower the participants so that they own the process from the very beginning. The participants should plan the process: They should agree on a timetable and a process design that would include information exchange, generation of alternative solutions, evaluation, decision-making and implementation. The resulting scheme may require the commitment of a full-time process manager and may require more than a year of work. See HALL, supra note 165, at 37. The Court should permit the mediator to be flexible in working with the parties over an indefinite period to attempt to achieve a resolution. On the other hand, periodic progress reports to the Court must be required to ensure that one or several of the parties are not dragging their feet to avoid implementation of any remedy. participants to those whose interest in the outcome is substantial. 224 The participants will be, in a sense, self-selected. Further, if sheer numbers of participants prohibits productive discussions, the mediator may use several strategies for managing the work without excluding participants. 225 While the mediation may take longer and be more difficult to manage with the inclusion of a large number of participants, the inclusion of those participants will ensure the success of the any settlement that may ultimately be reached.
Involving a broad range of interested constituencies in an effort to resolve school finance issues simply makes sense. Consensus building processes have been used successfully in a wide range of school disputes. 226 Further, the kind of wide-ranging reform required in a school finance case may not be possible to implement without broad-based public support. 227 Moreover, the major litigant named in the lawsuit, the General Assembly, is not an individual, but a public body. Members of the General Assembly represent diverse constituencies and are subject to conflicting pressures exerted by various interest groups, activists, and lobbying organizations. 228 concession during a mediation in an area in which they perceive themselves to be politically vulnerable, especially if core constituencies have expressed opposition to making concessions prior to the mediation. 2 29 Elected officials left to work toward a mediated solution in a closed process are, in essence, subject to the same pressures that created the already existing unconstitutional legislative scheme. In contrast, if the mediation process is open and its boundaries permeable, various individual interest groups can be allowed to express their points of view for themselves. Stakeholders who are present and involved can be encouraged through the process to understand the views of other parties, and can be encouraged to work toward collaborative solutions. In face-to-face problem solving sessions, stakeholders may be heard and their priorities may be realistically assessed and reordered. 230 The participation of a wide variety of interested groups would allow legislators to change their positions with the assurance that their constituents have considered the options and have been persuaded of the wisdom of the new solution. Finally, the process may provide a scapegoat for the legislature, allowing representatives to avoid taking political heat for changed positions or controversial votes. In its order referring the Ohio school finance case to mediation, the Supreme Court identified the plaintiffs, and the defendants-members of the Ohio General Assembly, the Ohio Board of Education, the Ohio Superintendent of Education, and the Ohio Department of Educationthrough their counsel, as the participants in the process. 232 The court further invited Governor Bob Taft, through counsel, to participate as a party for "purposes of the settlement conference." 233 These parties were, it appeared, the minimum necessary for any potentially binding settlement. Nevertheless, the State challenged the court's identification of the parties to be included in the mediation, objecting specifically to the designation of the Attorney General as counsel to represent the State and to the participation of the amici counsel, who represented minority party members of the General 229 Public choice theorists examining legislative process view legislators as rational bargainers who are motivated by a desire to be re-elected. See generally supra note 212.
230 CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra note 7 1, at 18-52 (describing methods for group problem solving and alternative approaches to managing conflict). 
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Assembly. 234 The Supreme Court rejected the State's arguments, pointing out that the defendants had consented to the participation of the identified attorneys throughout the life of the litigation. 235 The court further pointed out,
Experience has demonstrated that a satisfactory result is fostered in publicpolicy mediations as-contrasted with private dispute mediations involving individuals-by including representatives expressing the full range of competing interests.
236
In the Ohio school finance case, the court may have intended to permit the mediator to do the hard work of identifying the stakeholders and convening an inclusive process, but its order setting up the mediation did not express a vision of a broad-based, participatory process. The order appointed a single mediator and allowed for an initial six weeks to attempt to settle the case. The mediator faced immediate opposition to including even the parties who had participated in the litigation during the previous ten years. In this context, it may have been impossible to convene anything but the most constrained and limited group. If, on the other hand, the court had--early in the remedial phase of the litigation-entered a mediation order that appointed a team of mediators, that encouraged or required the parties to involve and include interested non-party stakeholders, and that set up generous time-frame, the important work of including the interested parties could have been done.
V. CONCLUSION
Following the failure of the DeRolph mediation, the Ohio Supreme Court granted the State's motion to reconsider the DeRolph III decision. 237 Vacating DeRolph III in its entirety, the Court returned to the reasoning and the result of the DeRolph I and DeRolph II decisions. 238 Once again, the Court held that the legislature had not fulfilled its Constitutional duty to 237 DeRolph IV, 780 N.E.2d 529 (2002). 238 Id. The decision on the motion for reconsideration resurrected the fourmember majority of the DeRolph I and DeRolph II decisions. Justice Pfeifer, who had joined the DeRolph III majority, returned to his earlier position and wrote the opinion for a majority that included justices Resnick, Sweeney and Douglas. Id. at 529.
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provide a "thorough and efficient system of common schools.
'239 And, once again, the Court gave no specific guidance to the legislature as to how to enact a constitutional school funding system beyond reiterating that a "complete systematic overhaul" of the school funding system is needed. 240 The remedy in the DeRolph case remains to be devised. 24 1 Further litigation relating to the remedy is likely.
School finance cases present difficult, complex, and seemingly intractable remedial issues. Litigation and its traditional remedial processes provide an unsatisfactorily blunt tool for the task of re-designing a complex school funding system. 242 Mediation, on the other hand, may be the device that is most ideally crafted for the job. Mediation as a process holds promise for resolving school finance reform litigation because it can provide a flexible procedure that may address the needs for the participation of a diverse and large number of constituencies; technical expertise and forwardlooking decision-making about complex issues; and consensus-building that will facilitate the cooperation among the various public entities involved in implementing the remedy. Mediation could lead to qualitatively superior solutions, through the information-sharing and mutual education involved in face-to-face negotiation sessions. (Certainly, the embarrassment of DeRolph Ill-in which the court based its decision on incomplete budget numberscould have been avoided if the state parties had been involved in making the remedial calculations. 243 ) A mediated process could give various constituencies an opportunity to participate in the development of the remedy, and thereby contribute to the legitimacy of the eventual solution. Mediation could also contribute to the stability and long-term success of the school reform remedy by creating grass-roots support for implementation of the remedy and by creating avenues of communication among the various interested parties. Even after the failure of the mediation effort in this case, 239 Id. at 530. 240 Id. at 533. In this author's view, in failing to devise a remedial procedure to enforce the finding of a constitutional violation, the court has side-stepped an important constitutional duty. The court ought not abdicate its responsibility to the plaintiffs because of the difficulty of devising a remedy. See Sturm, supra note 8, at 1379 (discussing the theory of the court's remedial power). 241 As Chief Justice Moyer pointed out in his dissent, the majority said "nothing concerning enforcement of its reaffirmed declaration that the current school-funding system is unconstitutional. It neither retains jurisdiction nor remands the cause to the trial court." Id. at 537 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting). 242 See supra text accompanying notes 43-64. There is never a time when education policy is all done. Education policy is dynamic, and the environment in which it exists-the economy, the technology, the expectations that society has of the schools-all those shift around, and education has to adapt. Are you going to have a court tell you the answer every week? The real question is how will these controversies be handled? By warring camps in adversarial roles or by a consensus seeking, congenial process?
244
Mediation was not the wrong answer in this case. Instead, the mediation-as ordered-was too much, too little, too late. It was too much constricted by the court's compromise on the remedy. 245 It was too little supported by clear statements regarding the rights and remedial principles that should have guided the mediation process and therefore generated too little motivation to settle. 246 Finally, by the time mediation was ordered it was too late, because the court's authority to give guidance on the matters that might have put an effective mediation process in motion had been seriously impaired by the compromise decision of September 2001.247
In vacating the compromise DeRolph III decision, however, the Court may have provided itself and the parties with a new window of opportunity. It may not be too late after all. The parties may now voluntarily engage in a facilitated negotiation process to effect the implementation of a constitutionally sound public school funding system. Alternatively, if the parties return to court in the future, the court will have a new opportunity to structure a participatory remediation process that is designed for success.
The lesson of the DeRolph case is not that court-ordered mediation cannot contribute to the successful resolution of difficult institutional reform litigation. Rather, DeRolph teaches that mediation is more likely to play a positive role in the resolution of an important institutional reform case if it is considered as a primary avenue of achieving remedial results rather than as a very last resort. Further, any court considering whether to order the mediation of an important institutional reform case should be attentive to creating a substantive and procedural framework that will support the parties' motivation and effort to devise their own remedy. The court should also consider the legitimacy benefit that may accrue from the participation of a broad group of interested constituencies and construct a framework that supports the mediator's efforts to identify and include stakeholders. Supported by a clear and unequivocal statement declaring the rights of the parties and remedial principles and a mediation order outlining fall-back remedial procedures that will be implemented if resolution is not achieved and creating incentives to permit participation by a broad range of nonlitigant stakeholders, future institutional reform mediations need not fail.
